

Need forces:

24.3.C capable of meeting nonnuclear attack with
non-nuclear response but also prepared
for nuclear operations as required & directed.

Provide info to GNCs + planning guidance to Services
for mid-range period beginning 1 July 66 (14-day);
Mil Obj, concepts for employment of forces,
basic undertakings to support obj.

program guidance

logistics planning guidance

R+D planning guidance

force obj. for allies

provide SecDef military guidance for FY 64 budget

justification for departmental FY 64 budget

requests

assessment of military aspects of previously

approved budget

help establish US military position

National capability to maintain the projected mobilization schedule would be severely impaired.

It is estimated that a major limiting factor on our capability to recover from a nuclear attack would be the shortage of effective manpower.

Production facilities would suffer severe damage.

c) Production base Military production would be at relatively low levels for the first several months after the nuclear exchange. The primary efforts will be directed toward producing relatively simple parts and components essential to survival and continuing combat operations.

d) Allied Forces Facilities No attempt has been made to estimate the effects of nuclear attack against our Allies. Allied military forces would receive the same degree of damage as comparable US forces in the same area. An attack on US & Allied forces facilities overseas would divert a

portion of the effort and to that extent, even

would be directed against the US, indicated on +2, 13.

and have both a "deterrent and a war-winning capability."

carriers take hours or days to get in position, whereas "the requirement is for immediate attacks at 4-hour to minimize damage to the US. Forces, which are not in launch position would appear to make a questionable contribution in initial and decisive operations.

[COERCION]

USOP provides info. to commands and planning guidance to Services.

Program guidance --- objective force levels considered necessary to support US military strategy.

Military engagement in [NATO] area contains the inherent risk of action and counteraction quickly involving general war.

General war cannot be excluded as the outcome of a local crisis in which both sides become progressively committed or in which a miscalculation by either side occurred. [Would objectives of US or SU be the same in this case as in a 'deliberate, cold-blooded attack'?] Any event, once the Soviets decide on general war, they will themselves seek to initiate it by surprise nuclear attack on the US. [DEF. of General War?]

They must design their initial attack so as to eliminate or reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation which could be launched by Western forces and so as to emerge with military superiors with which to pursue their objectives of world domination.

[US objectives: guarantee to protect its objectives]

CNO: bonus effect of ^{to [nuclear retaliating forces]} overlapping deterrence into field of limited aggression will shrink.

AF: Must be able to destroy delivery cap., control mechanisms and supporting resources... strategic advantage... must have both a "deterrent and a war-winning capability."

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... by maintaining forces clearly prepared to win either general or limited war."

... To convince nations & peoples of the world that US has the capability & will to use its armed forces in whatever form is necessary to make the use of force by the Com Bloc an unacceptable course of action.

LW: To deal swiftly and effectively with any limited war in a manner and on a scale best calculated to bring the LW to a conclusion satisfactory to the US and, consistent with the foregoing, to prevent the hostilities from broadening into ^{big nuclear} general war.

GW: The military objective of the US for GW [NOT DEFINED] is to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This includes:

a) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Communist China to the point where they have lost their will and ability [possible?] to continue the war [BNSP: to wage war] against the US and its Allies.

b) Providing for the defense of the US and other vital areas.
[for BNSP?]

c) Preserving and retaining as many of its effective allies as possible.

d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives. [WHICH ARE?]

[Don't fail to look at consequences of strategy for fear of "weakening resolve," "lowering objectives"; must look at consequences to achieve...]

may offer reasonable hope of achieving objectives such as prevailing, limiting damage, etc., when other strategies offer no such hope. Note that, just as US security is not the negation of SU security, US ability to prevail is not just the ability to prevent the SU from prevailing; concentration on last objective is not the best path to achieving the first. Many strategies might result in neither sides' prevailing, not because of "stalemate" but because ~~of~~ neither survives.]

Appropriate nuclear delivery forces will be designed to attack an optimum-mix target system (the NSTC) as an essential national task to be accomplished under the ^{[immediately] as soon as possible} several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. Specific objectives are:

a) Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and governmental controls of major importance.

b) Attack the major urban-industrial centers of the S-S Bloc to achieve the general level of destruction indicated in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy.

Logistics Annex B: It is possible that as many as 43M may be killed and an additional 12M injured. If so, some restriction may be imposed on the peak strength of the armed forces during later operations without reducing mental and physical standards for acceptance into the armed forces.

.... a major factor limiting our ability to survive & recover from nuclear attack would be the shortness of available & effective manpower

(14)

during a period of relative calm. The onset of a GW ~~is~~ probably will be characterized by an intense exchange of nuclear blows and the initiation of further operations and deployment by Army, Naval & Air Forces. The US will maintain a capability to accomplish its GW objectives regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated.

[Makes a difference what GW objectives are: destroy SV ability to wage war, or to continue war.]

During the initial operations the US will minimize loss and damage to the US and its Allies and will inflict in turn, maximum loss and damage on the enemy in order to either (a) bring about his capitulation, or (b) provide a residual margin of advantage to the US and its Allies.

[no longer: "sufficient to ensure victory"] The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons is that the US must emerge from the exchange [no longer: the initial exchange] with the greatest possible over-all advantage.

NO [The ~~new~~ coming survivability of control and of weapons and selectivity creates possibilities for strategy not previously feasible: e.g. - threat based on withheld forces] [These may, in some cases, be competitive with strategies directly attacking capabilities, ignoring effects on "will" or "intention"; but in other cases, such strategies

[To influence wartime operation, Pres. must: a) influence the set of contingency plans available, postural flexibility, warning-and-info system: status alive & available - striking plan; b) remain capable of modifying plan during hostilities; c) ensure that decision influences behavior.

Strat. Concept.

Objective of US and Allies is to promote the overall strength and unity of the Free World and to deter the S-S Bloc from the use of armed force.

[And to limit or improve the consequences to the US of an SU use of armed force. And to make unilateral use less likely, and less destabilizing.]

convince Allies that US strategy & policy serve their security interests

[And convince SU that not attacking US will serve ^{unauthorized US action} its security interests: reduce chance of accident, US false alarm, SU false alarm - e.g. based on US alerting procedures]

~~Notes~~

GW (not defined):

US forces may be required to take the initiative, if so directed by the President, for example, in response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment. [Not in SNSP]
However, US national policy precludes the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war.

[Pres. should have a variety of actions available to respond to knowledge that an enemy attack is imminent or that a major nuclear assault is underway. These should include plans for a US-initiative attack: designed to exploit circumstances in terms of US objectives. Also, possibilities for short, ultimatums.]

[Discourage SO from thinking pre-emptive attack preferable:
reduce chance of ^{SO} false alarm, ^(ambiguous US destroy moves) SO fear of US false alarm or
US unauthorized action; and advantage of pre-emptive attack
(US initiative might avoid SO cities; US retaliation much less
likely to).

^{manipulate?}
[AF claims: Delete "SO will". "Military objective is to
destroy enemy capability to wage war. [NO: Since when?
Work on will, mainly through effect on capability; to carry
war past point where enemy has lost his will to resist — further
to destroy his capability — may compromise other US objectives]

"The destruction of his will is in the political and psychological
fields and goes beyond the military strategy required to win a
war." [NO; "winning" often impossible unless strategy
designed to affect enemy will] (Not bought)

[Cannot hope, under all circumstances, to achieve US
objectives by destroying enemy capability to inflict damage.
The fact that "deterrence" has "failed" does not mean that
no further failures are possible.]

[Manitex? : ~~Instead of: "Mutual~~

Say: "~~Individual commanders will use nuclear weapons~~ ^{that}
when required in defense of their command."

Instead of: "However, designated commanders will be
prepared..."

Initial-subsequent phrase deleted.

exploitation forces

of military weapons. Plans will be formulated accordingly.
The JCS will, at the time of authorization, provide additional guidance, as required, for the use of nuclear weapons.

GW. US national policy precludes preventive war. GW, though not considered likely, might result from hostilities short of GW which were not initially intended by either side to lead to GW [i.e. war with USSR?], or might be initiated by the Soviets with little or no warning. In response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment, the US forces may be required to take the initiative, if so directed by the President.

..... Offensive opportunities created by the initial exchange will be exploited. Offensive & defensive employment of joint and combined military forces, and recovery and reconstitution of forces and the logistics base will be accorded to exploit the strategic advantage gained by the nuclear exchange and to minimize any gains which may have been made by the Soviets. No attempt is made to prejudge the length of a nuclear war.

[Any - Navy want to regard the "exploitation" phase